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Why dowry payments declined with modernisation in Europe but
are rising in India¤
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In contrast to most dowry oriented societies where payments have declined with modernisa-
tion, those in India have undergone signi¯cant in°ation over the last ¯ve decades. This paper
explains the di®erence between these two experiences by focusing on the role played by caste.
The theoretical model contrasts caste and non-caste based societies: in the former, there exists
an inherited component to status (caste) which is independent of wealth, while in the latter,
wealth is the primary determinant of status. Modernisation is assumed to involve two com-
ponents: increasing average wealth and increasing wealth dispersion within status (or caste)
groups. The paper shows that, in caste-based societies, the increases in wealth dispersion which
accompany modernisation necessarily lead to increases in dowry payments, whereas in non-caste
case based societies, increased dispersion has no real e®ect on dowry payments and increasing
average wealth causes the payments to decline.
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1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by the dramatic dowry in°ation occurring in India today. Real dowry
payments, the transfer of wealth from bridal families to grooms and their families at the time of
marriage, have risen over the last ¯ve decades. Rao (1993a and 1993b) and Deolalikar and Rao
(1990) show that, from 1921-1981, holding constant grooms' characteristics, controlling for the
wealth of both families, and imposing a real price index, the price of husbands has gone up.1 The
social consequences of this increase in dowry payments are severe. The sums of cash and goods
involved are often so large that the payment can lead to impoverishment of the bridal family. This
has a devastating e®ect on the lives of unmarried women who are increasingly considered burden-
some economic liabilities. The custom of dowry has been linked to the practice of female infanticide
and, among married women, to the more obvious connection with bride-burning and dowry-death,
i.e., physical harm visited on the wife if promised dowry payments are not forthcoming.2 In addi-
tion to real dowry in°ation, the custom of dowry payments has spread geographically and socially
throughout India into regions and communities where it was never practiced before (Paul 1986,
Rao 1993b, Kumari 1989, Srinivas 1980, Sharma 1984).3
Income transfers from the family of a bride to the groom or his parents (dowry), or from the
groom's parents to the bride's parents (bride-price), have existed for many centuries. The dowry
system dates back at least to the ancient Greco-Roman world (Hughes 1985). With the Barbarian
invasions, the Greco-Roman institution of dowry was eclipsed for a time as the Germanic obser-
vance of bride-price became prevalent throughout much of Europe; but dowry was widely reinstated
in the late Middle Ages. It is well known that in Medieval Europe and later, dowries were com-
mon practice among the aristocracy.4 Nonetheless, the convention of dowry has been historically
limited to only four percent of the cultures analysed in Murdoch's World Ethnographic Atlas and
1An escalation in Indian dowries has been previously recognized by numerous social scientists. See, for example,
Epstein (1973), Srinivas (1984), Paul (1986), Billig (1992), Caldwell et. al. (1983), and Lindenbaum (1981).
2Bloch and Rao (1999), Kumari (1989), Chauhan (1995), McCoid (1989), Pawar (1990), Lata (1990), and Pathak
(1990) address these issues.
3Various authors have documented the transition from bride-price to dowry in southern India (Caldwell et. al.
1983, Billig 1992, Epstein 1973, Srinivas 1984). Similarly, dowry payments now take place in rural areas whereas they
were once largely restricted to urban life (Caplan 1984 and Paul 1986). The custom has also permeated the social
hierarchy: typically, the practice is adopted by the upper castes, then over a period of time passes down into lower
castes, eventually reaching the Harijans, the lowest caste (Billig 1992, Caldwell et. al. 1983, Upadhya 1990).
4Botticini (1999) studies the dowry system in a Tuscan town between 1415 and 1436. Stuard (1981) investigates
dowries transferred among the nobles of medieval Ragusa (Dubrovnik) during 1235 to 1460. See Hughes (1985) for
a historical survey of dowry in Mediterranean Europe.
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restricted geographically to Europe and East Asia.5 The societies in which dowries appear seem
to exhibit substantial socio-economic di®erentiation and class strati¯cation.6 Moreover, their mar-
riage practices are typically monogamous, patrilineal, i.e., class status follows from the husband's,
and endogamous, i.e., men and women of equal status tend to marry (Gaulin and Boster 1990).
Marriage patterns in India follow these lines precisely; individuals are ranked according to caste,
same-caste marriage is essentially universal and, in the rare cases of across-caste marriage the
husband's caste determines that of the children.
Dowry escalation has also occurred in other societies. There are reports of dowry in°ation in
Roman times and amongst medieval noble families across Europe (see, for example, Stuard 1981,
Molho 1994, Saller 1994, and Stone 1965). China also seems to have experienced an episode of
dowry in°ation amongst the upper classes during the Sung period, 960-1279 (see, for example, and
Ebrey 1991 and 1993).7 However the general pattern in Europe was one of decline and eventual
disappearance of dowry with modernisation, as documented by Lambiri-Dimaki (1985).8 The
Indian experience of dowry increases and di®usion with modernisation stands in stark contrast and
remains unexplained.9
The present paper explains this di®erence by emphasizing the crucial role played by caste.
The model developed here contrasts caste and non-caste based societies. In the former, there
exists an inherited component to status (caste) which is independent of wealth, while in the latter,
wealth is the primary determinant of status. Modernisation comprises two components: an increase
5Murdoch's World Ethnographic Atlas examines 1267 societies.
6This argument is made by Jackson and Romney (1973), Harrell and Dickey (1985), and Gaulin and Boster (1990).
7However, in no period was China a dowry society comparable to India (see Tambiah 1973). China was historically
both a brideprice and dowry paying society. See Chan and Zhang (1999) for an analysis of their co-existence in Taiwan
and Watson and Ebrey (1991) for an overview of marriage in China.
8This is also documented for Brazil by Nazzari (1991). Dowry in China ceased to play an important role after the
Sung period (see Ebrey 1991).
9Another more straightforward economic explanation for dowry in°ation than the one provided here recognizes
dowry payments as a price, which increases from a scarcity of grooms. This \marriage squeeze" argument relies on the
fact that, in a rapidly growing population, where grooms marry younger brides, grooms are in relatively short supply
in the marriage market (see, for example, Rao 1993a and 1993b, Billig 1992, and Caldwell et. al. 1983). Since brides
reach marriageable age ahead of grooms, increases in population impact upon brides ¯rst, thus causing an excess
demand for grooms and an increase in price, i.e., dowry in°ation. However, it has been shown by Anderson (2000),
that this theory is untenable when modeled in a dynamic framework. That is, population growth cannot explain
dowry in°ation if women who do not ¯nd matches at the `desirable' marrying age can re-enter the marriage market
when older, as generally occurs. Secondly, most societies are characterized by persistent di®erences in ages of spouses,
with men on average marrying women who are younger (see, for example, Casterline et. al. 1986), and population
growth, however, the convention of dowry is limited historically to relatively few cultures. Notwithstanding this, it
is worth noting that the explanation for dowry in°ation in this paper can still occur with population growth, i.e., a
surplus of brides.
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in average wealth across the society and increased wealth dispersion within status groups. The
paper's main result is that, in the caste case, the increased dispersion in wealth accompanying
modernisation necessarily leads to increases in dowry payments, whereas in the non-caste case,
increased dispersion has no real e®ect on dowry payments and increasing average wealth causes the
payments to decline.
Marriage is analysed using a matching model in which dowries are solved as an equilibrium
payment made by a bride's family for a groom of a certain market value. An increase in the
dispersion of grooms' market values (i.e., wealth) should be expected to increase the spread of
dowries.10 The somewhat surprising result demonstrated here is that, in equilibrium, this also
raises average payments when caste (or inherited status) plays a role. That is, dowry in°ation
occurs in caste based societies. The intuitive reason for this is brought out in a simpli¯ed version
of the main model which is developed in Section 2.
In the absence of caste, however, an increase in dispersion is shown to simply lead to an in-
crease in the dispersion of dowry payments, with no real in°ation. Thus in societies where the
class structure only re°ects wealth di®erentiation, equilibrium dowry payments may occur, but the
model predicts dowries should not in°ate with increased wealth dispersion. Moreover, Section 4.1
demonstrates that if individuals on average become increasingly better o® with modernisation, such
societies will exhibit dowry de°ation. This decreasing wealth e®ect can also occur in caste-based
societies, but Section 4.2 establishes conditions under which the in°ating e®ect outweighs it.
It seems indisputable that the modernisation process entails increasing average wealth, but it
need not always be the case that the second assumed component, increased dispersion in wealth
within status groups, need arise. In the present-day Indian context, however, the evidence strongly
supports this assumption. Traditionally, one's caste (status group) innately determined one's oc-
cupation, education, and hence potential wealth in India. Modernisation in India has weakened
customary barriers to education and occupational opportunities for all castes and, as a result,
increased potential wealth heterogeneity within each caste (see, for example, Singh 1987, Sharma
1984, Kumar 1982, and Singh 1992). This characteristic of modernisation seems also to have played
a role during the Sung period in China. There the size of the educated class grew rapidly and, as
a consequence, created much competition amongst the educated but non-aristocratic class for elite
10That dowry payments can arise due to a matching problem in the marriage market which consists of relatively
heterogeneous grooms is demonstrated by Stapleton (1989) and Edlund (1996).
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positions. This contrasts with the prior T'ang period, where there existed a very small number of
ruling aristocrat families with no possibility for other classes to acquire elite positions (see, for ex-
ample, Ebrey 1991). In much of pre-industrial Europe, status group was also essentially determined
by birth. There also modernisation created new economic opportunities that tended to increase the
dispersion of incomes within status groups.11 As Stearns (1967) documents, industrialisation at the
beginning of the 19th century brought about the abolition of feudalism, the establishment of theo-
retical equality, and the end of inherited legal status. Modernisation then led to the decline of the
aristocracy and created a society where wealth became the principal criterion of social standing.12
This is in great contrast to present-day India where the inherent caste hierarchy remains rigid.
This paper argues that it is this key di®erence between the modernisation processes in present-day
India and pre-Industrial Europe that explains why dowries are increasing in India and declined
in Europe. As already mentioned above, the theoretical model predicts that societies based on
inherited status will experience in°ating dowry payments with modernisation whereas non-status
based societies will see a decline. This explanation is also consistent with other instances of dowry
in°ation which similarly con¯rm the model's prediction of the importance of inherited status.
The central focus of the paper is to explain why modernisation a®ects dowry payments di®er-
ently in caste based, compared to wealth based, societies. The main model of the paper, described
in Section 3, develops a matching framework for analysing the marriage market. Before developing
this general model, however, the next section provides a toy model that provides the intuition for
why caste (inherited status) plays a central role in generating dowry in°ation. Because, increased
wealth dispersion has no a®ect on real dowry payments in a wealth-based society, the paper isolates
the two components of modernisation and ¯rst explores the impact of increased wealth dispersion
only in a caste-based society in Section 3.3. Section 4 then analyses the impact of increasing average
wealth on dowry payments in both wealth and caste based societies. Section 5 concludes.
11The basis of pre-industrial society was agricultural, ruled by the landed aristocracy. Industrialisation brought
about mobility, urbanisation, and created new economic groups. See Stearns (1967) for a general survey of the social
impact of industrialisation in Europe.
12The social changes did not occur precisely at the same time nor at the same rate across Europe. In particular,
the decline of the importance of inherited status occurred ¯rst in the west of Europe then later in the east and south
(see Stearns 1967).
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2. Increased Wealth Dispersion and Caste
As already discussed, the important feature of modernisation which impacts upon dowry payments
di®erently in wealth and caste based societies is argued to be increased wealth dispersion within
status groups. This section develops a simpli¯ed version of the main model to highlight the role
played by caste, or inherited status groups, in this process.
Consider the case of two status groups, with 3 grooms and 3 brides in each. Since new income
earning opportunities brought about by modernisation are predominantly ¯lled by men, moderni-
sation has relatively little impact on the value of brides. Assume then, for simplicity (this will be
relaxed in the main model), that all 6 brides are homogeneous (from the perspective of grooms),
whereas grooms in the higher status group are of higher quality, represented by a higher income,
i.e., y2 > y1, with the high status group being denoted by 2 and the low by 1.
In a wealth based society, brides are only concerned with the income, y, of their potential
partners, whereas in a caste based society, they are also concerned with their status group or caste,
equal to 1 or 2. In this latter case, brides rank grooms in terms of both wealth and caste. Suppose
that there is some substitutability between these two components and recall that caste is patrilineal.
Substitutability implies that, because brides gain by marrying up in caste, brides of the lower caste
are less sensitive to income di®erences in higher caste grooms than are brides of the higher caste.
To make the argument even more stark, assume preferences are such that a lower caste bride is
indi®erent between grooms of di®erent incomes in the higher caste, that is, only caste matters to
them. This will again be relaxed in the main model. Brides are, of course, sensitive to income
di®erences of grooms in their own caste.
In the marriage market, dowry is a bid that a bride's family makes for a groom of certain market
value. As a result, in equilibrium, higher status grooms receive higher dowry payments. Without
explicitly solving for the equilibrium, the precise details of which are not consequential for the point
made here, denote the dowry payment that a high status groom receives by d(2) and that of the
lower status by d(1), where d(2) > d(1). Note that there are only two prices at this stage because
all grooms within each caste group are identical.
Now consider an increase in the wealth dispersion of grooms in status group 2 such that the
three grooms now have incomes equal to y2 ¡ µ; y2; and y2 + µ; where µ > 0. In a wealth based
society, this increased dispersion will increase the spread of dowries in status group 2. Therefore,
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dowries, in their simplest form, will equal d(2)¡ µ; d(2); and d(2)+ µ, but average dowry payments
will remain unchanged.
But this will not be the outcome in a caste based society. In this case, because lower caste
brides are only concerned with the caste of higher caste grooms, they are willing to o®er a dowry
payment d(2) to all grooms in caste 2, including the groom with income equal to y2 ¡ µ: Brides
in caste 2, however, value this lower quality groom less, and would like to o®er him d(2)¡ µ. But
because these high caste brides will forfeit their caste ranking if they marry into a lower caste, they
are willing to match the higher payment this groom is o®ered from brides in the lower caste. This
payment thus acts as a lower bound on the groom's dowry payment. The other two grooms in
caste 2 in turn receive equilibrium dowry payments equal to d(2) + µ and d(2) + 2µ since they also
have higher caste status but also have correspondingly higher wealth. As a result, average dowry
payments increase in this caste based society when wealth becomes more heterogeneous within
groups even though grooms' average wealth has not changed.
Due to the substitutability between groom's wealth and caste status (which has here been
assumed to operate in a very stark way), increased wealth dispersion alone has caused dowry
in°ation in this caste based model. The point of this model has been to show the avenue through
which caste a®ects payments. However, the model is dramatically simpli¯ed since it does not solve
for equilibrium values, nor properly specify preferences. The more general model developed in the
next sections does both of these things and introduces the other component of modernisation, i.e.,
increases in average wealth.
3. The Model
The model is developed for the general case of a caste based society which is segregated into caste
groups denoted by i, for i 2 f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; hg, where i = 1 denotes the lowest caste and i = h the
highest. Caste is used throughout the paper to refer to the inherited component of status, which
is independent of wealth. For analysis of societies that are not caste based we simply collapse the
set of caste groups into a single element so that the only di®erentiating feature is wealth.
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3.1. Preferences
A traditional marriage in dowry paying societies is arranged by the parents of the prospective brides
and grooms. Marriage generally unites men and women from the same caste (or status group); in
fact, several studies ¯nd that assortative mating on the basis of caste in India is close to perfect (see
for example, Deolalikar and Rao 1990, Bradford 1985, and Driver 1984). However, the rules of a
traditional Hindu marriage do allow for across-caste marriages between males of higher castes and
females of lower castes, although the opposite is condemned (Rao and Rao 1982, Avasthi 1979).
If a man marries a woman from another caste, he and his children are not deprived of his caste
membership; a woman marrying outside her caste, however, loses her membership and her children
take on the caste of her husband (Nishimura 1994). Hence for a woman, marrying down in caste is
highly detrimental, whereas marrying up in caste may not be. Parents are pressured to marry their
daughter to a man who is of the same or higher caste, lest their status be reduced to that of the
person who their daughter marries (Rao and Rao 1982, Avasthi 1979). Similar preferences existed
for parents in the elite classes of Medieval and Renaissance Europe where social status also passed
through the male line and there existed strong prejudices against daughters marrying \down", i.e.,
marrying men from a lower status group (see, for example, Johansson 1987 and Chojnacki 1974).
Not only are there di®erences between men and women in potential partnerships, but also the
importance of marriage is signi¯cantly greater for women. Families have an immense responsibility
to marry o® their daughters, and the sense of being a liability to one's parents is strong amongst
unmarried women. Asymmetries between men and women further extend into the process of
selecting mates. Typically, in India, the most important quality of a bride is a good appearance,
whereas for a groom it is the ability to earn a living, often re°ected in his educational level (see,
Rao and Rao 1980, Caldwell et. al. 1983, Billig 1992, Caplan 1984, Hooja 1969, Avasthi 1979, and
Chauhan 1995).
We capture these features in the following assumption:
Assumption 1: The quality of a groom in caste i; as perceived by a bride of caste j; is denoted
q(i ¡ j; yik), where q (¢) is increasing and concave in both its arguments. Both arguments are
substitutable (weakly), hence:
q(i ¡ j; yik)¡ q(i ¡ j; yik ¡ µ) > q(i ¡ j + 1; yik)¡ q(i ¡ j + 1; yik ¡ µ) (3.1)
8
for all i 6= j and yik is the kth element from the income distribution of caste i.
Assumption 1 implies that the absolute utility value of a given groom is greater the lower the
caste of the bride, but that brides of lower castes are less sensitive to income di®erences in higher
caste grooms than are brides of higher castes.13 This captures the feature of hierarchical societies
where lower caste brides receive a bene¯t from marrying higher than their own caste. Substitutabil-
ity between characteristics consequently implies that low caste brides are not as concerned with
the wealth of a higher caste grooms as are brides of the groom's same caste, who do not receive
any such bene¯t to marrying at their family's level.
In a wealth-based society, there is no caste component to a groom's quality, i.e., q (¢) is only a
function of his income.
The bride's family maximizes a utility function, de¯ned over q and a composite family con-
sumption good c, subject to their budget constraint, yjm ¸ pc+ d, where yjm denotes the income
of the bridal father, i.e. the mth element from the income distribution of caste j, p is the price of
c, and d is the dowry payment for a groom of quality q.14 Assuming separability in q and c; and
that the budget constraint binds, the utility function for a bride's family is represented by:
U = q(i ¡ j; yik) + u(yjm ¡ d); (3.2)
where p is suppressed since it plays no role. The function u(¢) is increasing and concave.
For simplicity, assume that a bride's quality does not enter directly into the marriage decision
of grooms, this shall be relaxed in a later section. The utility function for a potential groom and
his family is:
V = v(d); (3.3)
where v(¢) is increasing in d.
In equilibrium, dowry payments are a function of the utility parameters of (3.2), the incomes
of both families, and of time, t; (since income distributions are varying through time), that is,
d(i¡j; yik; yjm; t). However, since the purpose is to monitor changes in dowry payments for a given
13In the event of not marrying a bride keeps the caste of her father.
14It is implicitly assumed that each family has only one bride. Introducing more than one daughter into the analysis
will alter the level of income available for the marriage of each daughter but will not a®ect the general results.
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quality groom, de¯ned by his income and caste, through time, the notation can be compressed into
d(yik; t).
3.2. Pre-Modernisation Equilibrium
Equilibrium dowry payments for the benchmark pre-modernisation case, with grooms homogeneous
within each caste, are ¯rst considered. Pre-modernisation income levels are de¯ned as follows:
Assumption 2: Pre-modernisation, each male member of caste i has identical corresponding po-
tential wealth equal to Yi, where Y1 < Y2 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < Yh.
We take dowry payments in the lowest caste as numeraire. The price for the lowest caste grooms
is pinned down by participation constraints for both brides and grooms by arbitrarily dividing the
surplus to marriage. An equilibrium is a set of prices, d(Yi; 0), 1 · i · h, for a given income
distribution, such that no bride or groom can be made better o® by marrying someone else. In the
marriage market, brides of di®erent castes compete for grooms of varying qualities in rank order
of their caste. All potential brides prefer men of higher castes, but since brides of higher castes
have wealthier fathers and are subsequently willing to o®er higher dowries than lower caste brides,
assortative matching according to caste (same caste brides are matched with same caste grooms)
is an outcome.15 That equilibria with positive assortative matching are the only stable equilibria
when all men and women have identical preferences over potential mates, has been established
elsewhere.16
In equilibrium, brides make large enough payments at marriage to ensure that they are not
outbid by a lower caste bridal family. In the case of the lowest caste, prices are such that grooms
and brides prefer to marry than remain unmarried. The participation constraints for brides and
grooms are:
q(0; Yi) + u(Yi ¡ d(Yi; 0)) ¸ U (3.4)
v(d) ¸ V (3.5)
where U and V denote the reservation utilities of an unmarried bride and groom respectively. There
15The case where higher caste brides do not have wealthier fathers is considered later.
16See, for example, Becker (1991) and Lam (1988) for the case of transferable utility, and Gale and Shapley (1962)
for the case of non-transferable utility. See also, Eeckhout (2000) for a study of the uniqueness of this equilibrium in
the case of non-transferable utility.
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can exist many potential equilibria in which (3.4) and (3.5) hold. More speci¯cally, there exists a
marriage payment d(Y1; 0) = d such that all brides and grooms, in the lowest caste, prefer to marry
than remain single if the following holds:
'(V ) · d · Y1 ¡ Ã(U ¡ q(0; Y1)) (3.6)
where '(¢) and Ã(¢) are the respective inverse functions of v(¢) and u(¢). Restrictions (3.6) on
d directly follow from the participation constraints of brides and grooms, (3.4) and (3.5). The
left hand side of (3.6) is grooms' minimum acceptable dowry and the right hand side is brides'
maximum willingness to pay. It is assumed that U and V are su±ciently small so that there exists
a d where both parties prefer marriage to its alternative. Equilibrium payment d cannot be precisely
determined without adding more structure to the basic framework. As it stands, d can be positive
(a dowry) or negative (a bride-price). Assuming a numeraire d, however, we can generate a set of
equilibrium prices:
Proposition 1. In the pre-modernisation equilibrium, given a d satisfying (3.6), there exists a set
of equilibrium prices, d(Yi; 0), 1 < i · h, for a given income distribution such that dowry payments
are higher in higher castes:
d < d(Y2; 0) < ¢ ¢ ¢ < d(Yh; 0): (3.7)
Proof of the above is in the appendix. To understand how dowry payments are determined,
consider equilibrium conditions for members of a given caste i. The binding incentive compatibility
constraints can be expressed in terms of only two castes, i and i ¡ 1. This follows because the
highest price o®ered for a groom in caste i from all castes below is from the caste just below, i ¡ 1.
Since it is never worthwhile for higher caste brides to marry down, due to concavity in caste, the
amount a higher caste bride is willing to o®er to marry into a lower caste is less than the lower
caste brides are willing to pay grooms in their own caste. Hence o®ers from castes higher than i
are not binding constraints.
The grooms of the higher caste i are more desirable to all of the brides in castes i ¡ 1 and i.
Bridal fathers of the higher caste are wealthier and will therefore outbid brides in caste i for these
more desirable grooms. Taking the dowry price for caste i ¡ 1 grooms, d(Yi¡1; 0), as given, the
highest price a bride of caste i ¡ 1 is willing to pay for a groom of caste i satis¯es the following
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equation:
q(0; Yi¡1) + u(Yi¡1 ¡ d(Yi¡1; 0)) = q(1; Yi) + u(Yi¡1 ¡ d(Yi; 0)) (3.8)
where a bride of caste i ¡ 1 is indi®erent between marrying grooms of caste i ¡ 1 or i. The
di®erence between the payments which solve (3.8), d(Yi; 0) ¡ d(Yi¡1; 0), is positively related to
q(1; Yi)¡ q(0; Yi¡1); the marginal gain to a caste i ¡ 1 bride from marrying a groom of caste i. In
this equilibrium, brides of caste i pay d(Yi; 0), which solves (3.8) and match with caste i grooms for
all 1 < i · h. The grooms of caste i receive a higher payment than those of caste i¡1, not because
caste i brides have wealthier fathers, but rather because they are relatively more desirable than
lower caste grooms.17 Because of concavity in q(¢), the marginal gain to a bride from marrying
up in caste is less than the marginal disutility of marrying down in caste; it is always worthwhile
for a given bride to make the corresponding payment which satis¯es the incentive compatibility
constraint (3.8).18
Equilibrium marriage payments are a function of the quality di®erences between grooms, the
income of bridal fathers, and of the numeraire payment d. The speci¯cation of d does not add to the
central argument and is not explored further (the focus here is on how a process of modernisation
a®ects the time path of dowry payments, the initial starting point for that path is not relevant).19
It is possible that, because lowest caste grooms are of the least desirable quality, the marriage
transfer is such that these grooms are pushed down to their reservation utility, and therefore that
d is feasibly negative; i.e., a bride-price. The analysis is thus not inconsistent with bride-prices
occurring in lower castes and dowries in upper castes in the pre-modernisation case (as observed
in reality).20
17That higher dowry payments are transferred in higher castes is a relationship con¯rmed in numerous studies (see,
for example, Paul 1986 and Rao 1993b). It is perhaps worth noting that wealth di®erentiation among caste groups
is not necessary for this result; a caste premium alone would be su±cient since q(1; Y ) > q(0; Y ) for all Y . The
assumption of increasing wealth in rank order of caste is employed to avoid the possibility of higher caste brides not
being able to outbid lower caste brides due to credit constraints, as could be the case if Yi > Yi+1. This assumption
is relaxed later.
18It is implicitly assumed that equilibrium dowry payments satisfy the participation constraint of brides. The case
for when this assumption does not hold is analyzed in Section 3.3.3 where, due to credit constraints, higher caste
brides prefer to marry into lower castes than compete with lower caste brides for grooms within their own caste. In
reality, however, the families of brides will impoverish themselves before marrying their daughters into a lower caste,
or leave them unmarried.
19There is a substantial literature which does address precisely this question. See, for example, Becker (1991),
Grossbard-Shechtman (1993), Chan and Zhang (1999), and Botticini and Siow (2000).
20Traditionally, bride-price payments were practiced amongst the lower castes whereas dowry payments occurred
within the upper castes (see, for example, Blunt 1969, Srinivas 1978, and Miller 1980). Additionally, there are
numerous accounts of a transition from bride-price to dowry in the context of modernization, (see, for example,
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The existence of dowry payments here is due to the segregation of grooms into castes that vary by
their income and caste ranking. If all grooms were identical in terms of quality, no marriage transfers
would be necessary to satisfy equilibrium incentive conditions for brides. That is, with homogeneous
grooms and dowry payments equalling zero or a constant, no married couple would prefer to
be matched with anyone else, since all other matches would be identical from each individual's
perspective. Alternatively, when grooms are heterogeneous and brides are homogeneous, as in the
above analysis, a marriage market equilibrium exists only if higher dowry payments are transferred
to higher quality grooms. Otherwise all brides married to lower quality grooms would prefer to
match with higher quality grooms and a stable equilibrium in the marriage market would not exist.
Dowry payments occur in a wealth di®erentiated society for the same reason, there high wealth
grooms are compensated for the relatively high wealth that they bring to the marriage. That
dowry payments arise due to quality di®erentiation amongst grooms coincides with a consensus in
the literature that the custom of dowry is generally con¯ned to socially strati¯ed societies (see, for
example, Goody 1976, Harrel and Dickey 1985, Gaulin and Boster 1990, and Jackson and Romney
1973).
It is important to note that an equilibrium of endogamy (i.e., same status matching) can only be
supported if dowry payments occur (when grooms are heterogeneous). The underlying mechanism
which determines the value of these payments is that higher status brides outbid lower status brides.
This does not imply that, in reality, lower caste brides actively compete with higher caste brides
for their grooms. More realistically the analysis implies that, if payments did not exist there would
exist economic incentives for members of one caste to look for matches with members of the others.
With the existence of payments in equilibrium however, individuals have no incentive to marry
outside of caste, so that the system (of same caste marriages) remains an equilibrium outcome.
Caldwell et. al. 1983, Lindenbaum 1980, and Billig 1992). These ¯t well with the analysis here where it will be
demonstrated that development places an upward pressure on real marriage payments turning formerly negative
payments (or bride-prices) into positive payments (or dowries). However, the initial existence of bride-prices in lieu
of dowries is not explained. Bride-prices in India are typically associated with lower castes residing in rural areas and
are more common in southern regions. It can be reasoned that the value of a bride is higher in poorer families where
women generally engage in informal income-earning activities. Similarly, the societies of South India are traditionally
matrilineal and in consequence women have a somewhat higher status compared to northern states. This could lower
initial dowry levels by increasing the share of marriage surplus accruing to bridal families. When men are also a
homogeneous group, as in the pre-development scenario, marriage negotiations which reward this higher value for
women could induce bride-prices to occur. Once only men begin to reap the bene¯ts of development, the relative
value of men and women can be overturned and dowry payments emerge.
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3.3. Increasing Within Group Wealth Dispersion
Modernisation has two components in our framework: an increase in average wealth, and an increase
in dispersion within caste groups. In this section we consider the impact of the increase in dispersion
and delay consideration of increasing average wealth to Section 4.
The e®ects of modernisation are typically felt more strongly on the groom's side of the marriage
market, since formal job opportunities are ¯lled predominantly by males.21 Hence it shall be
assumed for now that increased wealth dispersion occurs only amongst grooms while among brides
the situation remains unchanged. This assumption is relaxed in a later section.
For simplicity, the within caste group spreading of the income distribution around Yi, which
denotes the pre-modernisation income level in caste i, is assumed to a®ect caste groups in a chrono-
logical order, percolating downwards from the highest caste. This accords with the Indian context,
where the pattern of increased heterogeneity seems to have followed a top-down path, but, in any
case, does not qualitatively a®ect results.22 In the ¯rst period of modernisation, members of caste
h have income distributed around Yh while incomes in other castes are unchanged. In the next
period, members of caste h ¡ 1 follow suit, and so on. Thus, denote the period in which caste i
undergoes its ¯rst increase in heterogeneity by si, where sh = 1 and si¡1 = si + 1 for 1 < i · h.
Let periods be denoted by t and we have the following,
Assumption 3: The evolution of wealth follows:
for t < si yi 2 fYig (3.9)
for t = si + ¿ yik 2 fYi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi + (¿ + 1)µg (3.10)
where yik denotes the kth income of members of caste i and ¿ = 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; : : :
The wealth distribution thus evolves according to:
² Period 0: fYhg; fYh¡1g; fYh¡2g; fYh¡3g; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; fY1g.
21The India population census data produced a female participation rate of 16% in 1991 (Mathur 1994).
22In the wake of Independence, many skilled jobs became available due to the departure of the British. These
jobs were ¯lled predominantly by members of the higher castes who had the prerequisite education (Kumar 1982).
Following the introduction of a±rmative action policies aimed at the lower castes, these higher skilled jobs began to
be ¯lled by all castes. However, this assumption does not necessarily suit the development process, as it existed in
pre-industrial Europe, where the middle classes were likely a®ected before the elite. In any case, the assumption is
made in order to simplify the exposition, and it does not alter the main results, as will be made clearer later.
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² Period 1: fYh ¡ µ; Yh; Yh + µg;fYh¡1g; fYh¡2g; fYh¡3g; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; fY1g.
² Period 2: fYh ¡2µ; Yh ¡ µ; Yh; Yh+ µ; Yh+2µg; fYh¡1 ¡ µ; Yh¡1; Yh¡1+ µg; fYh¡3g; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; fY1g.
...
A discrete distribution has been chosen so as to allow marriage market equilibrium conditions to
be de¯ned simply over a given groom quality across periods, and enable a closed form investigation
of real changes in dowry payments.23
To focus only on the role of increasing heterogeneity, consider a mean-preserving, discrete, and
uniform income distribution across periods: Let nt(yik) denote the number of men in caste i with
income yik in period t.
Assumption 4: The evolution of wealth satis¯es:
for t = si + ¿ n
t(yik) = n
t(Yi) for yik 2 fYi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi + (¿ + 1)µg (3.11)






t+1(yik) for all t.
The above implies that the number of men of each income level within a given caste and period
is equal and that the total supply of grooms remains constant across periods.
With modernisation, not only are grooms within each caste becoming a more heterogeneous
group, but so too are the fathers of the brides. We calibrate the time length of a period so that
it re°ects the time di®erence between two generations; the grooms of period t are thus the bridal
fathers of period t+1. With assortative matching, grooms and brides marry according to both caste
and income. The pattern of matching is complicated, however, by the time di®erence between two
generations. Since, in any given period t, bridal fathers are less dispersed than grooms, brides with
fathers of a given income level match with grooms of di®erent income levels. This follows since, given
Assumption 4, the number of grooms of a given income level in period t is necessarily smaller than
the number of bridal fathers of a corresponding income of period t¡1. Positive assortative matching
then implies that the brides with the highest income fathers within the income distribution of period
t ¡ 1, are matched with grooms of the two highest income levels from the income distribution of
period t. A similar reasoning follows for low income bridal fathers and grooms. This pattern of
23A marriage matching framework, analogous to the model here, for a continuous distribution of grooms and brides
is considered in Burdett and Coles (1997); however, they do not analyse the occurrence of marriage payments.
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matching of grooms and brides is formally established in the following lemma and proven in the
appendix.
Lemma 1. A wealth distribution which satis¯es assumptions 2, 3, and 4 and positive assortative
matching implies that: (i) for periods t ¸ si, brides with fathers of income Yi match with grooms
of income yik 2 fYi ¡ µ; Yi; Yi + µg; (ii) for periods t ¸ si + ¿ , where ¿ ¸ 1, brides with fathers of
income Yi ¡ ¿µ match with grooms of income yik 2 fYi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ; Yi ¡ ¿µg; and (iii) brides with
fathers of income Yi + ¿µ match with grooms of income yik 2 fYi + (¿ + 1)µ; Yi + ¿µg.
For now, assume that the income distributions of each caste do not overlap. That is, as mod-
ernisation progresses, the richest groom in caste i ¡ 1 has income less than the poorest groom in
caste i. This assumption is relaxed later.
3.3.1. Equilibrium Dowry Payments
The following proposition states the e®ect on dowry payments within a given caste i; of its ¯rst
increase in wealth dispersion. The more complicated time path of payments in all subsequent
periods is considered in the subsequent proposition:
Proposition 2. A real increase in dowry payments for grooms with mean income, Yi, occurs when
caste i experiences its initial increase in wealth dispersion.
Proof: When modernisation occurs in period t = si, grooms in caste i become a more het-
erogeneous group. Brides in caste i compete with lower caste brides for the lowest quality groom
in their caste and compete amongst themselves for those of higher quality. The highest payment
caste i ¡ 1 brides are willing to pay for the lowest quality groom in caste i satis¯es:
q(0; Yi¡1) + u(Yi¡1 ¡ d(Yi¡1; si)) = q(1; Yi ¡ µ) + u(Yi¡1 ¡ d(Yi ¡ µ; si)) (3.12)
This condition, together with the equilibrium condition in the period prior to modernisation (t =
si ¡ 1), incentive constraint (3.8), implies:
q(1; Yi) + u(Yi¡1 ¡ d(Yi; si ¡ 1)) = q(1; Yi ¡ µ) + u(Yi¡1 ¡ d(Yi ¡ µ; si)): (3.13)
Given Lemma 1, in equilibrium, brides match with di®erent type grooms within their own caste.
Brides take as given the highest deviation payment o®ered by brides in caste i ¡ 1, for the poorest
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groom in their caste, d(Yi ¡ µ; t) (as de¯ned by condition (3.12)); and o®er payments to the higher
quality grooms (of income Yi and Yi + µ) which solve:
q(0; Yi¡µ)+u(Yi¡d(Yi¡µ; si)) = q(0; Yi)+u(Yi¡d(Yi; si)) = q(0; Yi+µ)+u(Yi¡d(Yi+µ; si)): (3.14)
Assumption (3.1), together with (3.13) and (3.14), yields,
u(Yi ¡ d(Yi ¡ µ; si))¡ u(Yi ¡ d(Yi; si)) > u(Yi¡1 ¡ d(Yi ¡ µ; si))¡ u(Yi¡1 ¡ d(Yi; si ¡ 1)): (3.15)
Given the concavity of u(¢) and that Yi > Yi¡1, the above inequality implies that,
d(Yi; si) > d(Yi; si ¡ 1): (3.16)
Therefore real dowry in°ation occurs. ¥
Recall that in the ¯rst period of modernisation the income of bridal fathers is unchanged, so
that the above result is independent of any wealth e®ects on the demand side. The reason for the
real dowry in°ation is the substitutability between the two components of a groom's quality: his
potential wealth, yik, and his caste, i. Because of this substitutability, grooms who have been made
worse o® by modernisation, in terms of their potential wealth, can still trade on their caste status
because their caste is of value to lower caste brides. Since brides gain from marrying a higher caste
groom, and this gain is partially substitutable with income, his lower income is of relatively little
importance to them. As a consequence, a poorer groom in caste i is worth more to a bride from
caste i ¡ 1 than he is to a bride from his own caste, in absolute terms. However, because q(¢)
is concave, the loss in utility from marrying down in caste is greater than the utility gain from
marrying up. Brides of caste i are thus willing to outbid brides of caste i ¡ 1 in order to marry the
poorer grooms of their own caste, although they are paying a higher price than they would have
in the absence of competition from brides of lower castes. Condition (3.14) holds in equilibrium,
so that all dowry payments are determined relatively and hence there is a real increase in all other
payments. The following proposition, which is proven in the appendix, shows this to be the case
in all periods of modernisation.
Proposition 3. There is real in°ation in dowry payments for all grooms within a given caste i, in
all periods of modernisation, t ¸ si.
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Since there is real dowry in°ation for all grooms, average dowry payments in all castes also
rise. Increases in dowry payments in a caste-based society occurred due to competition from brides
of lower castes for higher caste grooms. In other words, dowry in°ation arises as an endogenous
response to a modernisation process which threatens the traditional social hierarchy; that is, indi-
viduals of di®erent castes having comparable income levels. In reality, as mentioned earlier, this
does not mean that we should observe active across caste competition. Instead it implies that the
observed dowry in°ation is serving to maintain the incentive compatibility of within caste mar-
riage when it is threatened by increasing wealth heterogeneity across caste groups. If incentive
compatibility were to fail then the caste system would be eroded since high caste grooms would
prefer to marry down in caste and accept larger o®ers from low caste brides. In a sense then the
model here suggests that in°ation in dowry payments has served to preserve same caste marriage,
and hence in turn preserve the caste system. When caste members are no longer homogeneous in
occupations and incomes, as is now the case in India, the only de¯ning feature of caste becomes
same-caste marriage. Writers on the pre-industrial European episodes of dowry in°ation also ar-
gued that increased dowry payments played a central role in maintaining endogamous (inherited
status) marriages.24 The results in this section show the mechanism through which such an e®ect
is possible.
In the Indian context, the temporal connection between dowry in°ation and income heterogene-
ity has already been noted by Chauhan (1995), who explicitly links the chronological changes in the
Indian dowry custom to increased wealth di®erentiation. She notes the spread of dowry practices
and the increase in payments directly after independence in 1947. This was a time of signi¯cant
structural change where unprecedented opportunities for economic and political mobility began to
open up for all castes (see also Jayaraman 1981).25 Others have similarly linked Indian dowry
di®usion and in°ation to new economic opportunities concomitant with modernisation.26 Some
sociologists argue that the spread of dowry payments from upper to lower castes is due to \San-
skritization", or lower caste imitation of the customs practiced in higher castes in order to acquire
24This has been argued by Stuard (1981) for Ragusa, Molho (1994) for Florence, Saller (1994) for Romans, Stone
(1965) for England, Chojnacki (1974) and Queller and Madden (1993) for Venice.
25The subsequent spread and escalation of dowry payments culminated in the passage of the Dowry Prohibition
Act in 1961 which outlawed the practice as a response to its alarming increase. The act has been to little avail,
however, since dowry in°ation has persisted despite its illegal standing.
26See, for example, Paul (1986), Srinivas (1984), Epstein (1973), Billig (1992), Caldwell et. al. (1983), Upadhya
(1990), and Chauhan (1995).
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status (see, for example, Epstein 1973).27 Such activity among lower castes has been facilitated
by increased wealth. While I do not argue with their interpretation, the theory here provides an
explanation of the same facts based on economic reasoning.
3.3.2. Comparative Statics and Empirical Predictions
Although it is the substitutability between the components of q(¢) which is the central reason for
the occurrence of real dowry in°ation during the process of modernisation, other factors alter the
rate of in°ation across periods. These relationships are summarized in the following proposition
which is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 4. The rate of in°ation in dowry payments of a given caste is: (a) increasing in the
degree of wealth dispersion within that caste; (b) increasing in the degree of dispersion in all castes
below; and (c) is higher the greater the income disparity between the rich of the lower castes and
the poor of the higher castes.
The cause of dowry in°ation is across-caste competition forcing a lower bound on dowry pay-
ments within caste. Further increases in dowry payments occur when this lower bound is further
increased. E®ect (a) lowers the income of the lowest groom in a given caste, but this is relatively
unimportant to brides of the next lower caste, who are the most direct competitors for him, due
to substitutability in q(¢); so that equilibrium dowry payments required from his own caste bride
fall less than proportionately. Since within caste payments then only re°ect the income di®erences
between other grooms and the lower one, all other payments also rise. Similarly e®ect (b) occurs
because increased dispersion in castes below raises dowry payments in those lower castes and hence
raises the highest bid, which is determined relative to these payments, that the richest brides there
27Dowry has also been interpreted as compensation for taking into the family an economically non-productive
female member (see, for example, Rajaraman 1983, Srinivas 1984, and Beck 1972). This compensation argument
for dowry does not account for its occurrence in places where women's economic activity has continued (see, for
example, Chauhan 1995). In general there is little support for this view since increasing the economic qualities of
women through education and other income-earning capabilities seems to have had little e®ect on dowries (see, for
example, Billig 1992 and Sandhu 1988). As dowries are variable instead of uniform, as suggested by the compensation
conjecture, i.e., valuation placed on subsistence cost of a woman net of her domestic contribution, the compensation
argument can again be refuted (see Aziz 1983). Another view of dowry as a medium of hypergamy (when lower status
bridal families match with those of a superior status) sheds no light on why dowry has been increasing and also why
it occurs where marriage takes place among men and women of equal social status (see Chauhan 1995). Dowry
increases have also been associated with a growing necessity to compete for `desirable' grooms (see, for example,
Lindenbaum 1981). This association is consistent with the analysis here, but, as already discussed, does not, on it's
own, constitute an explanation for real dowry in°ation.
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will make for the poorest groom in one's own caste. Since the lower bound again rises, all other
grooms payments rise accordingly to maintain incentive compatibility in assortative matching. Fi-
nally e®ect (c) follows because, the larger the income of high caste bridal fathers, relative to the
highest bidders from the lower castes, the larger the increase in dowry payments relative to this
lower bound.
In the above analysis, dowry in°ation a®ects higher castes ¯rst because members of these
castes reap the bene¯ts of modernisation before the lower castes. This coincides with the observed
empirical record in India (see, for example, Paul 1986, Sharma 1984, and Srinivas 1984). However,
none of the results in this section depend upon the assumption that modernisation spreads to lower
castes one period at time. This can be seen from the previous proposition. Since in°ation occurs
because across-caste competition forces a lower bound on within caste dowry payments, increasing
the lower castes' dispersion before, or simultaneously with, one's own caste implies qualitatively
identical results. As the proposition shows, all increases in dispersion, whether within own caste or
within another work the same way, so the result is not a®ected by the ordering of those increases.
3.3.3. Disappearance of Dowry In°ation
In the above analysis, endogamous marriage is the equilibrium matching outcome; all brides and
grooms marry within caste. This corresponds with India where assortative matching on the basis
of caste is close to perfect. However, the model predicts this will cease to be an equilibrium if
income distributions across castes become more equal. In particular, if grooms at the high end of
the wealth distribution in caste i¡1 have signi¯cantly greater incomes than those at the low end of
the income distribution of caste i, within caste incentive compatibility breaks down and matching
across castes occurs; brides from caste i marry down in caste as their spouses have high enough
incomes to compensate for the loss of status in terms of caste. Endogamy will similarly break down
if dowry payments increase to such an extent that brides' participation constraints no longer hold.
At these prices, brides would prefer to marry down in caste.
If endogamy breaks down, increased dispersion no longer leads to dowry in°ation. In that case
income alone determines dowry payments. Consider the e®ects of increased wealth dispersion in a
wealth-based society. Moving from a period in which all grooms have income Yi and receive dowry
payment d¤(Yi), to one in which grooms are uniformly distributed around Yi, will simply see a
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spread in equilibrium dowry payments accordingly. Brides will be indi®erent between marrying the
di®erent quality grooms (who now vary by income) and hence lower quality grooms receive payments
lower than d¤(Yi), and higher income grooms receive higher payments. If bride's preferences for
grooms' quality is concave in income, average dowry payments can even decrease across periods,
since then the lower dowry payments have a larger negative impact on average dowry payments
then the higher dowry payments have positive, compared to the previous period where average
dowry payments are equal to d¤(Yi).28
Another way dowry payments can fall is if women start to have value in the marriage market.29
Within caste dowry payments fall when brides become economically valuable since this value acts
as a substitute for their dowry payment. However, increased income dispersion across both brides
and grooms will still tend to have an in°ationary e®ect. This is because it is the caste component of
groom's quality which is essential to the previous results. Recall that it was the groom's caste which
maintained the marriage market value of those whose income fell with modernization. No such e®ect
is present for brides who forfeit their own caste ranking when marrying down. Consequently these
gender asymmetries with respect to caste imply that even when women begin to reap comparable
bene¯ts to men from modernisation, dowry in°ation can persist. This is perhaps why it has been
observed that increasing the quality (in terms of education and productivity) of brides has had only
a meager e®ect in reducing the dowry problem in India (see, for example, Saroja and Chandrika
1991 and Sandhu 1988).
4. Increasing Average Wealth
We now turn to the more standard component of the modernisation process, that of a rise in average
wealth. We ¯rst consider how this aspect a®ects dowry payments in a non{caste based society. We
will see that the e®ects are similar in a caste based society, however, the wealth dispersion e®ects
discussed in the previous section must also be taken into account in that case.
28This decreasing e®ect on average dowry payments is also present in the caste case. Similarly, because the
development process is such that the lowest quality grooms in period t + 1 is of lower quality than the lowest of
the previous period, the payments received by the lowest quality grooms could conceivably decrease average dowry
payments across periods even though dowry payments for all other grooms are increasing. However, a minimal
restriction on the concavity of q(¢) rules this out, i.e., 2 [f (q2(0; yik ¡ µ)) ¡ f (q2(1; yik ¡ µ))] > f (q2(1; yik ¡ µ)),
where f(¢) is increasing.
29There are several studies which ¯nd that, holding groom characteristics constant, there has been a signi¯cant
increase over time in the schooling of brides (see for example, Deolalikar and Rao 1990, and Billig 1992).
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where yik 2 fYi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi + (¿ + 1)µg for t = si + ¿ where ¿ = 0; 1; 2; 3; : : :
4.1. Wealth based society
In a wealth-based society, potential spouses simply match according to income, i.e., brides with
wealthy fathers are matched with high income grooms. Dowry payments can occur in such a society,
just as they did in the pre-modernisation case of the previous section, if men are more di®erentiated
than women. Holding the wealth distribution constant, dowry payments decline if women begin
to bene¯t from modernisation for the reasons discussed above. Similarly, as already mentioned,
increasing wealth dispersion can also lead to non-increasing average dowry payments. In addition,
real dowry payments also change with the population's average wealth. This works in a seemingly
counter-intuitive direction in a matching framework. When individuals become increasingly better
o®, the supply of wealthy grooms necessarily exceeds the supply of wealthy bridal fathers. As a
result, in a matching model of marriage, bridal fathers of a given wealth match their daughters with
richer grooms than themselves. This implies that, for a given quality groom, poorer bridal fathers
are determining dowry payments across time. Therefore, in other words, real dowry de°ation occurs
when average wealth is increasing.
Proposition 5. Real dowry payments are non-increasing in a wealth based society when the fol-












where yik 2 fYi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi + (¿ + 1)µg and y 2 fYi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi + ¿µg for t = si + ¿
where ¿ = 0; 1; 2; 3; : : :
The above proposition, which is proven in the appendix, establishes su±cient conditions for
when dowry payments are non-increasing across periods. Condition (4.2) simply implies that the
number of people in the positive end of the wealth distribution is increasing and condition (4.3)
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implies that there are always some people becoming wealthier. Conditions (4.2) and (4.3) are
satis¯ed for a mean-preserving income such as (3.11), and satis¯ed for most cases of increasing
average wealth. The exception would be a wealth distribution where, although the total number
at the top end of the income distribution is decreasing across time, average wealth could still be
increasing (i.e., (4.1) is satis¯ed) if the number of the richest people in the top end of the distribution
is su±ciently large. Therefore, with the exception of extremely unequal income distributions, we
should expect that dowry payments are non-increasing when average wealth is increasing. Since
dowry payments are non-increasing for all grooms, average dowry payments should also be non-
increasing. However, this latter result is not as straightforward to demonstrate since there are
several e®ects to consider.30
Proposition 5 points out that a more simple explanation for dowry in°ation, which treats
grooms as a normal good and posits an increase in the expenditure on grooms when average wealth
increases, is unlikely to hold in a matching model of marriage. Conversely it suggests a force leading
dowry payments to decline with modernisation in a wealth-based society such as post-Industrial
Europe.
4.2. Caste based society
Though dowry payments are likely to decline with increases in average wealth in a wealth based so-
ciety, they need not do so in a caste based one. Counteracting the force for decline working through
Proposition 5 is the already analysed e®ect of increased wealth dispersion within caste groups. The
following proposition establishes a su±cient condition under which the latter dominates:
Proposition 6. Real dowry in°ation occurs if:
f(q(0; Yi ¡ zµ)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ (z + 1)µ))jYi ¡ zµ)¡ f(q(1; Yi ¡ zµ)¡ q(1; Yi ¡ (z + 1)µ)jYi¡1)
> f(q(0; Yi + (z + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ zµ)jYi ¡ zµ)¡ f(q(0; Yi(z + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ zµ)jYi ¡ (z ¡ 1)µ)
(4.4)
where z ¸ 1 and f(a¡b j y) is increasing in y and (a¡b) and represents that the marginal valuation
of grooms is conditional on bridal father income, y.
30On the one hand, the larger the increase in average wealth the greater the dowry de°ation across grooms, however,
there also exists a larger number of high quality grooms. In addition, concavity implies that richer grooms are of
lower marginal value than those poorer.
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Proof of the above is in the appendix. Condition (4.4) ensures that the positive caste e®ect of
modernisation outweighs the negative income e®ect on equilibrium dowry payments. The condition
does not look very intuitive but has a simple interpretation. It suggests that in°ation is likely to
occur if there exists su±cient income disparity across castes, i.e., if [Yi ¡ zµ]¡ [Yi¡1] is su±ciently
larger than [Yi ¡ zµ]¡ [Yi ¡ (z ¡ 1)µ] = µ; and if the bene¯t to marrying up in caste, independent
of the income bene¯t, is su±ciently large.
For a caste based society, the main conclusion is that the severity of dowry in°ation is mitigated
by increases in average wealth, especially if they are relatively uniformly spread. In a wealth based
society, dowry payments will decline if on average individuals experience an increase in wealth.
5. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to explain why dowry payments are increasing in present-day India while
they declined with industrialization in Europe. I argue that the key di®erence between these two
societies is that the early industrial period in Europe saw wealth come to dominate inherited status
as the primary determinant of social class. In contrast, the process of modernization in India has
lead to virtually no e®ect on caste's central role in determining status.
When caste breaks down, the model predicts that the forces of modernisation tend to cause
a decline in dowry payments. So continued dowry in°ation, and its attendant problems in India
should decline when endogamy breaks down and caste ceases to be an important determinant of
status. This suggests a role for government in attempting to formally weaken the importance
of caste. A±rmative Action laws to date have removed customary barriers to educational and
occupational opportunities, and property ownership for members of the lower castes. These types
of policies should have an e®ect in the long run since, as the paper demonstrated, endogamy will
eventually break down when there is su±cient income equality across caste groups.
In short, where marriage matching places less value on the caste of potential mates, there
should be less in°ation in dowry payments. A case study of Christians in Madras revealed that
increasing dowry payments occurred among those with a caste a±liation whereas among those
who were casteless there was no comparable e®ect (see Caplan 1984). Caplan there concludes that
this provides evidence that dowry payments should be seen as a means of \preserving endogamous
boundaries in a heterogeneous setting" (p.216). This accords precisely with the present paper's
24
argument. Here dowry in°ation arises as an endogenous response to same-caste matching in the
marriage market when there is increased wealth dispersion (or heterogeneity). Although research
pertaining to dowry payments in the rest of South Asia is relatively sparse, there are some reports
of increasing dowries in Pakistan (see Sathar and Kazi 1988). This may appear to contradict the
emphasis on caste in explaining dowry in°ation since caste is rooted in Hinduism and is not a
component of Islamic religious codes. However, for the purposes here, caste does exist amongst
Muslims in Pakistan. That is, there traditionally exists a hierarchical social structure based on
occupation, where group membership is inherited and endogamy is practised within the di®erent
groups (see, for example, Korson 1971, Dixon 1982, Beall 1995, Ahmad 1977, and Lindholm 1985).
The theoretical ¯nding in this paper is also consistent with other observed instances of dowry
in°ation. A persistent feature of these previously noted dowry in°ations is that they tended to occur
in societies where inherited status was an important component of social standing and endogamy
was practiced. Molho (1994) establishes a link between high rates of endogamy among high status
lineages and dowry in°ation in late medieval Florence. Saller (1994) makes the same connection in
her analysis of dowry in°ation in Roman marriages and so does Stuard (1981) amongst Ragusan
noble families during the thirteenth and ¯fteenth centuries. Moreover, the analysis of this paper
predicts dowry in°ation when the modernisation process threatens the traditional social hierarchy,
i.e., individuals of di®erent status groups have comparable wealth levels. This is exactly in accord
with Stone (1965) who notes that dowries in England increased by a third when \daughters of
the nobility were faced with growing competition from daughters of the squierarchy". This is
similarly argued by Chojnacki (1974) where he links dowry in°ation in early Renaissance Venice to
competition between the oldest noble clans and newer ones, where the relative newcomers sought
status by means of higher dowries and the more ancient families fought to preserve theirs by the
same means. This paper argues that why dowry in°ation ceased in these once endogamous societies
is because endogamy eventually broke down. This occurred with modernisation when lower status
individuals gained increasing wealth and the signi¯cance of inherited status declined.
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6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Taking condition (3.8) as given for all i, where 1 · i < h, we can show that it is not worthwhile
deviating to marry in a di®erent caste, given equilibrium prices.
Suppose the contrary and that it is worthwhile to marry down in caste for a bride in caste i,
i.e.,
q(¡k; Yi¡k) + u(Yi ¡ d(Yi¡k; 0)) > q(0; Yi) + u(Yi ¡ d(Yi; 0)) (6.1)
holds for k, where 1 · k < i. The above can be rewritten as:
u(Yi ¡ d(Yi¡k; 0))¡ u(Yi ¡ d(Yi; 0)) > q(0; Yi)¡ q(¡k; Yi¡k): (6.2)
Inequality (6.2) can in turn be rewritten as:
kX
j=1
fu(Yi ¡ d(Yi¡j; 0))¡ u(Yi ¡ d(Yi¡j+1; 0))g > q(0; Yi)¡ q(¡k; Yi¡k): (6.3)
Concavity of u(¢) implies the following must also be true:
kX
j=1
fu(Yi¡j ¡ d(Yi¡j; 0))¡ u(Yi¡j ¡ d(Yi¡j+1; 0))g > q(0; Yi)¡ q(¡k; Yi¡k): (6.4)
Using equilibrium condition (3.8), the left hand side of (6.4) is equal to:
kX
j=1
fq(1; Yi¡j+1)¡ q(0; Yi¡j)g : (6.5)
The right hand side of (6.4) is equivalent to:
kX
j=1
fq(¡j + 1; Yi¡j+1)¡ q(¡j; Yi¡j)g : (6.6)
Concavity of q(¢) implies that (6.6) is larger than (6.5) and hence (6.1) is contradicted.
Now suppose it is worthwhile to marry up in caste for a bride in caste i, i.e.,
q(k; Yi+k) + u(Yi ¡ d(Yi+k; 0)) > q(0; Yi) + u(Yi ¡ d(Yi; 0)); (6.7)
for 1 · k · h ¡ i. The above is rewritten as:
u(Yi ¡ d(Yi; 0))¡ u(Yi ¡ d(Yi+k; 0)) < q(k; Yi+k)¡ q(0; Yi): (6.8)
Inequality (6.8) can in turn be rewritten as:
kX
j=1
fu(Yi ¡ d(Yi+j¡1; 0))¡ u(Yi ¡ d(Yi+j ; 0))g < q(k; Yi+k)¡ q(0; Yi): (6.9)
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Concavity of u(¢) implies the following must also be true:
kX
j=1
fu(Yi+j¡1 ¡ d(Yi+j¡1; 0))¡ u(Yi+j¡1 ¡ d(Yi+j; 0))g < q(k; Yi+k)¡ q(0; Yi): (6.10)
Using equilibrium condition (3.8), the left hand side of (6.10) is equal to:
kX
j=1
fq(1; Yi+j)¡ q(0; Yi+j¡1)g : (6.11)
The right hand side of (6.10) is equivalent to:
kX
j=1
fq(j; Yi+j)¡ q(j ¡ 1; Yi+j¡1)g : (6.12)
Concavity of q(¢) implies that (6.12) is smaller than (6.11) and hence (6.7) is contradicted.
Equilibrium condition (3.8) implies that d < d(Y2; 0) < ¢ ¢ ¢ < d(Yh; 0) since q(1; Yi+1) > q(0; Yi)
for all i, where 1 · i < h. ¥
Proof of Lemma 1:
With positive assortative matching, the matching pattern of (i) and (ii) will hold in period
t = si+1, that is, grooms of income Yi ¡2µ match with bridal fathers of income Yi ¡ µ and grooms
with income Yi ¡ µ match with bridal fathers of income Yi ¡ µ and Yi, if:
nt(Yi ¡ 2µ) + nt(Yi ¡ µ) > nt¡1(Yi ¡ µ) > nt(Yi ¡ 2µ): (6.13)
Similarly, the matching pattern of (i) and (ii) will hold in period t = si + 2 if:
nt(Yi ¡ 3µ) + nt(Yi ¡ 2µ) > nt¡1(Yi ¡ 2µ) > nt(Yi ¡ 3µ) (6.14)
and µ
[nt(Yi ¡ 3µ) + nt(Yi ¡ 2µ)¡ nt¡1(Yi ¡ 2µ)]
+nt(Yi ¡ µ)
¶
> nt¡1(Yi ¡ µ)
>
·




where nt(Yi ¡3µ)+nt(Yi ¡2µ)¡nt¡1(Yi ¡2µ) re°ects the excess supply of grooms of income Yi ¡2µ
who match with bridal fathers of income Yi ¡ µ instead of those with income Yi ¡ 2µ. Inequality
(6.15) can be rewritten as:
nt(Yi ¡ 3µ) + nt(Yi ¡ 2µ) + nt(Yi ¡ µ) > nt¡1(Yi ¡ 2µ) + nt¡1(Yi ¡ µ) > nt(Yi ¡ 3µ) + nt(Yi ¡ 2µ):
The matching pattern of (iii) will hold if identical conditions to the above are satis¯ed for higher
income grooms and bridal fathers, i.e., substituting the minus sign for a plus in the income levels
of the above inequalities.
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More generally the matching pattern (i), (ii), and (iii) ensues if in each period t = si + ¿ , for
¿ ¸ 0, the following hold:
¿+1X
z=®
nt(Yi ¡ zµ) >
¿X
z=®
nt¡1(Yi ¡ zµ) >
¿+1X
z=®+1
nt(Yi ¡ zµ) (6.16)
¿+1X
z=®
nt(Yi + zµ) >
¿X
z=®
nt¡1(Yi + zµ) >
¿+1X
z=®+1
nt(Yi + zµ) (6.17)
for ® = 1; 2; 3; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ¿ . Given (3.11), conditions (6.16) and (6.17) can be rewritten as:
(¿ + 1¡ ®)nt(yik) > (¿ ¡ ®)nt¡1(yik) > (¿ ¡ ®)nt(yik): (6.18)
where yik 2 fYi ¡ (¿ +1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi+(¿ +1)µg. Given (3.11) and using the assumption that the total
supply of grooms within a given caste i is constant across periods t. The number of grooms of each





Using (6.19), (6.18) becomes:









Since [3 + 2(¿ ¡ 1)][¿ + 1¡ ®] > [3 + 2¿ ][¿ ¡ ®], (6.20) implies that (6.18) is satis¯ed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3:
From (3.16), we know that d(Yi; si) > d(Yi; si ¡ 1).
Without loss of generality, a given equilibrium condition, (3.14) for example, can be rewritten
as:
d(Yi; t)¡ d(Yi ¡ µ; t) = f(q(0; Yi)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ µ) j Yi)
where f(a¡b j y) is increasing in y and (a¡b) and represents that the di®erence in dowry payments,
d(Yi; t)¡ d(Yi ¡ µ; t), is conditional on bridal father income, Yi.
For periods t > si +1, more general equilibrium incentive conditions hold than those discussed
in Section 5. In particular, more general than (3.12), equilibrium incentive compatibility condition
at the caste margins is:
q(0; Yi¡1 + ¿µ) + u(Yi¡1 + (¿ ¡ 1)µ ¡ d(Yi¡1 + ¿µ; t)) =
q(1; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ) + u(Yi¡1 + (¿ ¡ 1)µ ¡ d(Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ; t)): (6.21)
for periods t = si + ¿ , where ¿ ¸ 1. Similarly, additional to (3.14), within caste equilibrium
conditions are:
q(0; Yi ¡(¿ +1)µ)+u(Yi ¡¿µ ¡d(Yi ¡(¿+1)µ; t)) = q(0; Yi ¡¿µ)+u(Yi ¡¿µ ¡d(Yi ¡¿µ; t)): (6.22)
for the poorer grooms and
q(0; Yi+(¿ +1)µ)+u(Yi+¿µ ¡d(Yi+(¿+1)µ; t)) = q(0; Yi+¿µ)+u(Yi+¿µ ¡d(Yi+¿µ; t)); (6.23)
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for those richer. Equilibrium, conditions (3.14), (6.22), (6.23) must hold for all t ¸ si + ¿ , where
¿ ¸ 1.
Equilibrium conditions (6.21), (3.14), and (6.22) for caste i, and (3.14) and (6.23) for caste i¡1
imply that for ¿ ¸ 0:










q(0; Yi¡1 + kµ)¡
q(0; Yi¡1 + (k ¡ 1)µ) j Yi¡1 + (k ¡ 1)µ
¶
: (6.24)
Using (6.24) de¯ned for periods ¿ and ¿ + 1, we have:
d(Yi; si + ¿ + 1)¡ d(Yi; si + ¿) = d(Yi¡1; si + ¿ + 1)¡ d(Yi¡1; si + ¿)
+f (q(1; Yi ¡ (¿ + 2)µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡1 + (¿ + 1)µ) j Yi¡1 + ¿µ)
¡f (q(1; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡1 + ¿µ) j Yi¡1 + (¿ ¡ 1)µ)
+f (q(0; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ (¿ + 2)µ) j Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)
+f (q(0; Yi¡1 + (¿ + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡1 + ¿µ) j Yi¡1 + ¿µ) :
The above implies the following also holds:
d(Yi; si + ¿ + 1)¡ d(Yi; si + ¿) > d(Yi¡1; si + ¿ + 1)¡ d(Yi¡1; si + ¿)
+f (q(1; Yi ¡ (¿ + 2)µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡1 + (¿ + 1)µ) j Yi¡1 + ¿µ)
¡f (q(1; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡1 + ¿µ) j Yi¡1 + ¿µ)
+f (q(0; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ (¿ + 2)µ) j Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)
+f (q(0; Yi¡1 + (¿ + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡1 + ¿µ) j Yi¡1 + ¿µ) ;
since Yi¡1 + (¿ ¡ 1)µ < Yi¡1 + ¿µ. The above can be expressed more simply, without loss of
generality, as:
d(Yi; si + ¿ + 1)¡ d(Yi; si + ¿) > d(Yi¡1; si + ¿ + 1)¡ d(Yi¡1; si + ¿)
+f (q(0; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ (¿ + 2)µ) j Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)
¡f (q(1; Yi ¡ (¿ + 2)µ)¡ q(1; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ) j Yi¡1 + ¿µ) :(6.25)
The ¯nal component of the right hand side of (6.25) follows because any two equilibrium conditions:
q(a) ¡ q(b) = u(y ¡ d(b)) ¡ u(y ¡ d(a)) and q(b) ¡ q(c) = u(y ¡ d(c)) ¡ u(y ¡ d(b)) imply that
q(a)¡ q(c) = u(y ¡ d(c))¡ u(y ¡ d(a)), where a, b, and c represent di®erent grooms.
For ¿ = 0, i.e., t = si < si¡1, (3.8) implies that d(Yi¡1; si + ¿ + 1) = d(Yi¡1; si + ¿) and hence
the right hand side of (6.25) is positive given (3.1) and Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ > Yi¡1 + ¿µ.
Solving (6.25) backwards from payments in the lowest caste, d, the above di®erence can be
rewritten as:
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f (q(0; Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j)µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j + 1)µ) j Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j)µ)
¡f (q(1; Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j)µ)¡ q(1; Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j + 1)µ) j Yi¡j¡1 + (¿ ¡ j ¡ 1)µ)
¾
+f (q(0; Yi¡¿ )¡ q(0; Yi¡¿ ¡ µ) j Yi¡¿ )¡ f (q(1; Yi¡¿ )¡ q(1; Yi¡¿ ¡ µ) j Yi¡¿¡1) (6.26)
for ¿ ¸ 1. Given (3.1), Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j)µ > Yi¡j¡1+(¿ ¡ j ¡1)µ for 0 · j · ¿ ¡1, and Yi¡¿ > Yi¡¿¡1,
the right hand side of (6.26) is positive. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4:
²(a)
The component of the real change in dowry payments, represented by (6.25), caused by within-
caste heterogeneity is represented by ­(¿); for t = si + ¿; where;
­(¿) = f(q(0; Yi ¡ ¿µ)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ))¡ f(q(1; Yi ¡ ¿µ)¡ q(1; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)) (6.27)
Therefore,
­(¿+1) = f(q(0; Yi¡(¿+1)µ)¡q(0; Yi¡(¿+2)µ))¡f(q(1; Yi¡(¿+1)µ)¡q(1; Yi¡(¿+2)µ)) (6.28)
Due to the restrictions on q(¢), ­(¿ + 1) > ­(¿). Therefore the degree of dowry in°ation increases
with within-caste heterogeneity because within-caste heterogeneity increases with ¿: Conditions
(3.14), (6.22), and (6.23) imply that the component of real dowry in°ation caused by heterogeneity
for all yik 2 fYi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi + (¿ + 1)µg; where ¿ ¸ 0; is equal to ­(¿) of (6.27). ¥
²(b)
The component of real dowry in°ation which re°ects heterogeneity in castes below is represented
by d(Yi¡1; si + ¿)¡ d(Yi¡1; si + ¿ ¡ 1) in (6.25). For periods t < si¡1, this component is equal to
zero from (3.8). For periods t ¸ si¡1, this di®erence is represented by (6.25), where i is replaced
by i ¡1 in the notation. Given that ­(¿ +1) > ­(¿), equivalently the dowry di®erence d(Yi¡1; si+
¿)¡ d(Yi¡1; si + ¿ ¡ 1) is increasing in ¿ as heterogeneity in caste i ¡ 1 increases, thus increasing
the degree of real dowry in°ation in payments of caste i ¡ 1 and caste i. Conditions (3.14), (6.22),
and (6.23) imply that the component of real dowry in°ation which re°ects heterogeneity in castes
below is equal to d(Yi¡1; si + ¿)¡ d(Yi¡1; si + ¿ ¡ 1) for all yik 2 fYi ¡ (¿ +1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi + (¿ +1)µg;
where ¿ ¸ 0. Expression (6.26) demonstrates that dowry in°ation in caste i is increasing in the
within-caste heterogeneity of all castes below denoted i ¡ j for 1 · j · ¿ . ¥
²(c)
The change in dowry payments across periods of (6.25) is increasing in Yi ¡ ¿µ and decreasing
in Yi¡1 + (¿ ¡ 1)µ). Therefore the degree of dowry in°ation is increasing in the di®erence between
Yi¡¿µ and Yi¡1+(¿ ¡1)µ, i.e., between the incomes of the richest bridal father in caste i¡1 and the
poorest bridal father in caste i. The larger this di®erence the greater the income disparity across
castes. Conditions (3.14), (6.22), and (6.23) imply that the component of real dowry in°ation due
to the income of bridal fathers is equivalent for all yik 2 fYi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi + (¿ + 1)µg; where
¿ ¸ 0. Expression (6.26) demonstrates that dowry in°ation in caste i is increasing in the income
disparity across all castes i ¡ j for 1 · j · ¿ . ¥
Proof of Proposition 5:
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Dowry payments are increasing for a groom of quality yg; matched with a bride whose father's
income is equal to yb in period t, if grooms of quality yg are matched with bridal fathers of income
yb + µ in period t+1; yb +2µ in period t+2, and so on. In other words, a necessary condition for
dowry payments to be increasing for such a groom is that the supply of grooms and bridal fathers









for ® ¸ 0:


















which contradicts (4.2). ¥
Proof of Proposition 6:
In the absence of real wealth e®ects, as demonstrated in Proposition 3, dowry in°ation will ensue
due to the across-caste e®ects. If grooms of a given quality are matched with richer bridal fathers
across time then real dowry payments will increase. If grooms of a given quality of income are
matched with poorer bridal fathers across time then dowry payments may decline. Since all dowry
payments are determined relatively, dowry payments for a given groom with income yg are more
likely to decline if all grooms with income less than yg are also matching with poorer bridal fathers
across time. Consider the extreme case where all grooms are matched with the poorest bridal
fathers possible and hence the most likely to exhibit dowry de°ation across periods. The within-
caste equilibrium conditions imply that for a groom of income yik 2 fYi ¡(¿+1)µ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Yi+(¿+1)µg
where ¿ ¸ 0:
d(yik; si + ¿)¡ d(Yi¡1; si + ¿) = f (q(1; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡1 + ¿µ) j Yi¡1 + (¿ ¡ 1)µ)
+f (q(0; yik)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ (¿ + 1)µ) j Yi ¡ ¿µ) (6.33)
+f (q(0; Yi¡1 + ¿µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡1) j Yi¡1 ¡ (¿ ¡ 1)µ)
Using (6.33) and solving backwards:





f (q(0; Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j)µ)¡ q(0; Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j + 1)µ) j Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j)µ)







f (q(0; Yi¡j)¡ q(0; Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j)µ) j Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j)µ)¡
f (q(0; Yi¡j)¡ q(0; Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j)µ) j Yi¡j ¡ (¿ ¡ j ¡ 1)µ)
¾
(6.34)
+f (q(0; yik)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ ¿µ) j Yi ¡ ¿µ)¡ f (q(0; yik)¡ q(0; Yi ¡ ¿µ) j Yi ¡ (¿ ¡ 1)µ)
where the ¯rst component of the right hand side comes from the positive across-caste e®ect on
dowries. The second two component represent the negative income e®ects on dowries. The above
di®erence is always positive if the across-caste e®ect outweighs the income e®ect. This is always
true if condition (4.4) holds. If this extreme case holds, then all other possible di®erences in dowry
payments are larger than (6.33). ¥
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